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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
Index Number: 400897/2014 
ANDREWS, PAMELA 
VS 
NYS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
Sequence Number : 
ARTICLE 78 
PART IA PART 16 
INDEX NO.-----
MOTION DATE ___ _ 
MOTION SEQ. NO. - --
The following papers, numbered 1 to _ _ , were read on this motion to/for------- ------
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause - Affidavits - Exhibits I No(s). ____ _ 
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Replylng Affidavits I No(s). ___ _ _ 
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NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
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Motion Seq. No. 001 
Before the Court is a petition brought by Pamela Andrews in the nature of an Article 
78 proceeding. Ms. Andrews is asking this Court to order a new parole hearing, one where 
she will be provided with all the material relied on by the Parole Board ("Board") and one 
where serious consideration will be given to factors other than the crime for which she has 
been incarcerated for 23 years. The sentence imposed by Supreme Court, 20 years to life, 
was pursuant to Ms. Andrews' plea of guilty to Murder in the Second Degree. At the time 
Ms. Andrews brought this petition, she had been before the Board four times and denied 
releasEj each time. The denial challen~ed herein was issued on January 7, 2014. 
While this proceeding was pending before this Court, Ms. Andrews appeared before 
another Board on October 28, 2014. That appearance was a de novo hearing agreed to 
by respondents in response to petitioner's earlier Article 78 petition challenging a 
December 4, 2012 decision denying parole. The January 7, 2014 appearance and denial 
at issue herein is unrelated to the October 28, 2014 appearance, it being a regularly 
scheduled parole hearing. 
Not surprisingly, Ms. Andrew's request for release was denied by a different Board 
on October 28, 2014, and a reappearance was ordered for 24 months later, in October 
2016. I say "not surprisingly" because if she had been granted release, clearly this Article 
78 would be moot and there would not be a reason for this decision. But since Ms. 
Andrews was once again denied release, is this Article 78 moot? 
Respondents argue that it is moot because Ms. Andrews has received what she 
requested; namely, an opportunity to plead for her release before another Board. The 
October 2014 appearance, counsel urges, mooted out the arguments made vis-a-vis the 
January 2014 denial challenged herein, and the petition should therefore be dismissed. 1 
But what Ms. Andrews is requesting here is not simply a new hearing that perpetuates the 
same flaws that she complains of in relation to the January hearing. 
Respondents insist that the law is clear that when an individual obtains a new parole 
hearing before another Board while an Article 78 proceeding is pending, the Article 78 is 
rendered moot ~ecause the sole relief a court can give is to grant another hearing. 
Respondent cites for this principle cases such as Matter of Siao-Pao v Travis, 5 AD3d 150 
(1st Dep't 2004), Iv denied 3 NY3d 603, and Matter of Hall v NYS Division of Parole, 18 
AD3d 1036 (3rd Dep't 2005), Iv denied 5 NY3d 843. However, a second hearing arguably 
must be one sufficiently different from the first so that the new opportunity to be heard is 
indeed a new opportunity, not one encumbered by the same problems. 
1Since this issue of mootness occurred after commencement of the Article 78, it 
was argued in letters requested by the Court and submitted by counsel, dated 
November 6, 2014 from respondents, November 12, 2014 from petitioner, and 
November 18, 2014 from respondents. Also, oral argument was held on November 21, 
2014. After oral argument, a transcript of the October 2014 hearing was submitted, 
along with simultaneous letters from both counsel dated December 12, 2014. 
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Counsel for Ms. Andrews asserts that the case is not moot, pointing to McLaurin v 
New York State Board of Parole, 27 AD3d 565 (2nd Dep't 2006), Iv denied 7 NY3d 708, 
where there was, as in this case, a second parole hearing. But at that second hearing, the 
Board still did not have before it the re-sentencing minutes, which was the problem at the 
first hearing. Therefore, in neither hearing were the minutes considered. The court found 
an exception to the mootness doctrine existed because the substantial issue presented 
was likely to recur and, in fact, it did recur. 
I find the same thing here. The defect alleged by petitioner - that various 
documents were not disclosed to her at all or were improperly redacted before disclosure 
- · occurred both in January and October 2014, and counsel complains of the same errors 
in connection with both hearings. Specifically, at both appearances Ms. Andrews did not 
receive the sentencing judge's letter. Nor did she receive complete copies of the Inmate 
Status Report, where Sections 2 and 3 were redacted, or an unredacted COMPAS report, 
which is essentially a risk assessment document. 
The judge's letter was provided to this Court in camera, as were the two unredacted 
reports. As far as any victim statement, counsel for the State says even she has never 
seen it as it is never shared with anyone. A court order would be required as to both the 
letter from the sentencing judge and the victim impact statement. I am not prepared to 
order the release of the victim statement because good reasons exist why the victim should 
feel uninhibited in what she/he writes. However, the situation is different with regard to the 
judge's letter. Since that letter is written in the judge's official capacity and provides 
opinions that may be influential to the Board, the letter should be shared with the inmate. 
As to the COMPAS report, at both hearings certain parts of the report were 
redacted. But it was brought out by the Commissioners at both hearings that Ms. Andrews 
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was given a low risk assessment for violence, absconding, etc. Those parts were left intact 
for her to read. 2 
The two Boards that heard Ms. Andrews' applications denied parole based on the 
seriousness of the crime and Ms. Andrews' insufficient insight. Also, both Boards did say, 
in a perfunctory way, that they considered all the statutory factors relevant to release. 
Counsel for Ms. Andrews argues that the decisions were arbitrary and capricious 
because each decision lacked details explaining why release was not granted and 
improperly relied on the seriousness of the crime to the exclusion of the other factors, all 
of which favored release. Finally and most significantly, she argues that the omitted 
documents deprived her of a fair hearing. And, as stated earlier, since these same 
omissions occurred in October, in other words were not cured, the argument remains 
relevant. 
The facts of the crime, a particularly senseless murder of a friend Raquel Montano, 
wherein Ms. Anderson was aided by her daughter Shakota Andrews, do not have to be 
recounted here. Those facts were reviewed in great detail at both hearings, and it is clear 
that the events surrounding the crime were understandably of significant interest to the 
Commissioners. In fact, those discussions virtually monopolized both appearances. 
2Counsel for petitioner also argues that the Board erred in failing to develop and 
utilize in the hearings a Transitional Accounting Plan (TAP). Counsel argues this failure 
disclosed respondent's real intent to deny her release. This Court disagrees. The TAP 
was required to be prepared pursuant to a law passed in 2011 and effective October 1, 
2011. The law speaks to the Plan being prepared upon an inmate's admission to .an 
institution, and is silent about retroactivity. Since Ms. Andrews was admitted to prison 
many years before 2011, respondent reasonably argues that the TAP requirement does 
not apply to her. See, Rivera v NYS Div. of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 (3rd Dep't 2014). 
Further, I do not accept petitioner's argument that the absence of a TAP shows a 
predisposition here by the State to deny parole. Unlike the COMPAS assessment and 
the Inmate Status Report which are prepared when an inmate comes up for parole, the 
TAP merely describes the inmate when she begins serving her sentence. 
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However, those facts have not changed. All concerned here, especially Ms. 
Andrews, have openly discussed these events. Ms. Andrews also has clearly shown, what 
appears to all, to have sincere sorrow and remorse for what she did 24 years ago. Nothing 
more can be added to or taken from this terrible act. Certainly, the Parole Board concerned 
with Ms. Andrews' discretionary release application had a right to consider the crime and 
even to give this factor more attention and weight than it gave to other factors. However, 
other factors are enumerated in Executive Law §259-c that also must be considered. 
But it is the claims regarding the failure to release documents on which the Boards 
relied that most concerns this Court. All of these documents were requested by petitioner's 
counsel, including the letter from the sentencing judge, the victim statement, and the two 
unredacted Reports. 
Because the documents were not fully disclosed, Ms. Andrews was not in a position 
to confront or challenge the documents if they were unfavorable or contained mistakes. 
Nor was she in a position to rely on them if the redacted portions supported her plea that 
it was time to release her because the risk for repeating the violent act and/or absconding 
from parole was low. This, I find, was not fair. 
In attempting to persuade the Board that release was appropriate, Ms. Andrews was 
deprived of the right to confront or rely on evidence that the Board had before it. Not only 
was that unfair, but it is inconsistent with the dictates of the provisions of the New York 
Code of Rules and Regulations spelled out in Title 9, Part 8000. Section 8000.5 (c) entitled 
"Access to case records maintained by the Division of Parole" speaks directly to the access 
issue, stating in subdivision (1) that an inmate or her counsel "may have access to 
information contained in the parole case record" before a scheduled appearance or before 
perfecting an administrative appeal. 
5 
Subdivision (2) of this Section discusses a variety of concerns the Division must 
consider "to protect the internal process by which division personnel assist the Board in 
formulating individual decisions with respect to inmates and releasees." Those concerns 
deal with "legitimate correctional interests of security, custody, supervision or 
rehabilitation." Also included is information received from other agencies or other 
jurisdictions. Additionally, there is the goal of permitting "private citizens to express freely 
their opinions for or against an individual's parole." Finally, there is the desire to "permit 
a candid process of factual analysis, opinion formulation, evaluation and recommendation 
to be continued by professional staff." 
These concerns then translate into specific conditions and limitations regarding 
access to the records. In subdivision (2)(i) the Rule states that access should be granted 
to portions of the case record that "will be considered by the Board" except as to items 
specified in (a) and (b), which read as follows: 
(a)(1) diagnostic opinions which, if known to the 
inmate/releasee, could lead to a serious 
disruption of his institutional program or 
supervision; 
(2) materials which would reveal sources of 
information obtained upon a promise of 
confidentiality; 
(3) any information which if disclosed might 
result in harm, physical or otherwise, to any 
person; 
(b) access by the Division of Parole shall not be 
granted to reports, documents and materials of 
other agencies, including but not limited to 
probation reports, drug abuse and alcoholism 
rehabilitation records, and the DCJS report. 
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Therefore, when respondents simply assert that the materials were properly withheld 
in whole or in part because they are evaluative in nature, they overlook the important 
modifying language in subdivisions (a)(1) and (3), that an exemption applies only if 
disclosure "could lead to a serious disruption of [the inmate's] institutional program or 
supervision" or "might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to any person". There has 
been absolutely no showing in this particular case that disclosure of the sentencing judge's 
letter or the unredacted Inmate Status Report or the COMPAS Re-Entry Risk Assessment 
would lead to any serious disruption or any harm to anyone, and based on the Court's in 
camera review of those documents, no such claim can reasonably be made here. 
As to subdivision (a)(2) providing for an exemption to preserve confidentiality, 
despite my not actually knowing that the victim was specifically promised confidentiality, 
it is fair to assume that something of this nature was conveyed. Such a reassurance is 
often made to encourage an honest, complete and uncensored statement as to the 
individ~al's feelings. Therefore, I am not directing the release to petitioner of any victim 
statement. 
Respondents also cite the Public Officers Law, more commonly known as the 
Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL"), and particularly §87 entitled "access to agency 
records" and the specific exemptions granted to agencies pursuant to §87, subd. (2)(a),(f) 
and (g). But this reliance by the State, though accepted in some judicial opinions for 
purposes of depriving an inmate of the contents of her file, is flawed. 3 
FOIL is directed at the public at large. It is based on the concept of transparency 
of public records and is in furtherance of an informed public's knowledgeable participation 
in self-governance. But these goals have nothing to do with an inmate's right to see and 
3 No opinion from the First Department has been cited or found . 
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address records in his or her own institutional file. Nor does it have anything to do with the 
transparency of public records. Rather, it has everything to do with the issue of an 
individual's ability to knowingly confront adverse documents or rely on favorable documents 
pertaining to his/her own freedom, that being here Ms. Andrews' release from prison after 
almost a quarter of a century. 
Also, the specific exemptions relied upon by respondents do not truly apply to the 
documents here in question. Section 87(2)(a) is simply a general statement that disclosure 
will not occur if the document is specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal 
statute. That section has no relevance here because, as discussed above, the exemptions 
in the NYCRR have no application in this case. Section 87(2)(f) exempts documents which 
"if disclosed could endanger the life or safety of any person." Again, nothing in 
respondents' papers suggests that disclosure of the subject documents would cause any 
danger, and any such suggestion could only apply to the protected victim statement. 
Finally, §87(2)(g) pertains to "inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not: 
i. statistical or factual tabulations or data; 
ii. instructions to staff that affect the public; 
iii. final agency policy or determinations; and 
iv. external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the 
comptroller and the federal government." 
An example of respondents' reliance on FOIL exemptions is footnote 2 on page 8 
of the Answer. There counsel says that only Part I of the COMPAS report was disclosed 
to petitioner, and she cites Public Officers Law §87(g) to support the exemption of the rest. 
Specifically, she alleges that Parts II and Ill are exempt from disclosure as intra-agency 
materials containing evaluative opinion information and thus were submitted for in camera 
review only, citing Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 8 1 O AD3d 829 (3rd Dep't 2004). 
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However, there is not one mention of FOIL in Zhang. That is a very short decision 
by the Third Department overruling the lower court's finding that the determination by the 
Board was not sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent judicial review. Respondents there 
appealed and won a reversal. The Appellate Division found that the Board did sufficiently 
detail its grounds for denial of release. 
Second, because FOIL deals with public disclosure of governmental documents, 
one can understand why "intra-agency material containing evaluative opinion" or non-final 
opinions are exempt. Such an exemption would be reasonable as it includes opinions only, 
as opposed to accepted policy decisions. In other words, these documents, non-final 
ones, reflect policy in the making, and disclosing them to the public could well be 
disruptive to the agency's arriving at final decisions. 
But the above rationale has nothing to do with diagnostic or evaluative opinions 
found in the COMPAS report or the Inmate Status Report. Here, no public policy is 
involved. Also, these evaluations are prepared by Corrections employees familiar with the 
inmate. The name of the author of these reports is provided. Therefore, there is no good 
reason to prevent the . inmate, here Ms. Andrews, from knowing how the evaluative 
opinions and conclusions were reached. The information may help or hurt her, but it is 
certainly relevant if the Board has seen the entire document and relies on it. Thus, this 
Court finds that both the COMPAS report and the Inmate Status Report should be 
disclosed. 
Regarding the sentencing judge's letter not disclosed to petitioner but provided to 
the Court for in camera review, at oral argument, when asked for the authority justifying 
nondisclosure, counsel cited the Third Department decision of Grigger v New York State 
Division of Parole, 11 AD3d 850 (2004). There, the inmate in question made a FOIL 
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request for a copy of official statements by the sentencing judge and the Richmond County 
District Attorney which his file indicated had been received. Respondent denied this 
request. An in camera inspection of the file by the judge hearing Grigger's Article 78 
established that there was no statement from the sentencing judge. Instead, there was 
merely a communication from the judge's staff that he had retired. Because this letter was 
shown to the inmate, the issue became moot, and Grigger is therefore clearly 
distinguishable from our case. But in contrast with the judge's letter, the court held that a 
letter from the prosecuting District Attorney was exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIL 
[POL §87(2)(g)] as it was an inter-agency communication. The Article 78 judge, however, 
expunged the DA letter from the record for reasons not relevant here. 
The appellate court modified the expungement but upheld the §87(2)(g)(iii) 
exemption. Its rationale, after reviewing the letter, was that it fell precisely within the scope 
of the inter-agency exemption for pre-decisional, non-final recommendations by employees 
of one agency to assist decision makers in another agency in reaching a decision. 
Grigger cites to two other arguably relevant Third Department cases, Matter of 
Ramah/av Bruno, 273 AD2d 521 (2000), Iv denied 95 NY2d 767, and Matter of Mingo v 
NYS Div. of Parole, 244 AD2d 781 (1997), as well as a Court of Appeals decision referred 
to in Mingo, Russo v Nassau County Comm. Coll., 81 NY2d 690 (1993). The appellate 
cases concern inmates' failed attempts to obtain documents in their files. In Ramah/a, the 
respondent Bruno was the District Attorney for Rensselaer County who had sent a letter 
to the Division of Parole in advance of the inmate's parole hearing. Ramahlo was denied 
parole, and then requested a copy of that letter in an Article 78 proceeding pursuant to 
FOIL. Bruno refused and cited §87(2)(g) of FOIL. That decision was affirmed because, 
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similar to the communication from the District Attorney in Grigger, it fell under the 
exemption involving inter-agency materials which are not final agency policy or 
determinations. This Court has no quarrel with those decisions. District Attorneys may 
have information to provide, such as background material or other factors, which that writer 
believes would aid in the decision making process. 
However, judges are not District Attorneys. A communication from the sentencing 
judge presumably would not contain any new information. Rather, it would express an 
opinion, not a non-final report from an agency, which the Parole Board may find useful. 
In Russo (supra) our highest court saw fit to refer to the definition part of the Public 
Officers Law to determine whether a film used by a Community College should be 
disclosed to a petitioner. Obviously, these facts are very different from those here, but the 
definitions in §86 of FOIL are instructive. The term "agency" is defined as follows (with 
emphasis added): 
any state or municipal department, board, 
bureau, division, commission, committee, public 
authority, public corporation, council, office or 
other governmental entity performing a 
governmental or proprietary function for the state 
or any one or more municipalities thereof, 
EXCEPT THE JUDICIARY or the state 
legislature. 
Therefore, clearly it would be error to rely on the exemption in 87(2)(g) to deny 
access to a letter from a judge. The exemption specifically refers to an "agency" and, as 
discussed earlier, refers to communications exchanged for discussion purposes. It does 
not include an opinion or recommendation provided by the sentencing judge. During this 
Court's in camera inspection of the file, I noted that there was a letter from the sentencing 
judge which, by its first sentence, made it clear that it was written in response to a letter 
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dated October 5, 2012 from Gregory J. Seeley, Senior Parole Officer. Based on my earlier 
discussion, I find that such a letter is not exempt under 87(2)(g) or any other part of FOIL 
or the relevant Rules and Regulations. It therefore should either be disclosed to 
Ms. Andrews or expunged from her file and not given to any parole Commissioner hearing 
her case. 
Ms. Andrews was denied parole in both January and October of 2014 for primarily, 
if not exclusively, one reason, the seriousness of the crime she committed 24 years ago. 
But even the Commissioners denying her release seem to acknowledge that she has 
experienced and has expressed genuine remorse. Respondents argue, and the law 
supports the argument, that parole is discretionary and that the Board is allowed broad 
discretion when considering the statutory factors such that the circumstances of the crime, 
here murder, may be given more weight than other factors. 
Thus, respondents could urge that a new hearing, simply providing greater access 
to file documents, in all probability would not alter the result. The State may be right on this 
point. But even if true, it is irrelevant. Petitioner is entitled not only to a fair hearing, which 
I have found she has not received, but also one where the Board does not affirmatively 
violate any principle of statutory review. Here, I find that the Board violated the Rules and 
Regulations earlier referred to by denying Ms. Andrews access to records in her file that 
were considered by the Board but not provided to her in whole or in part. As detailed 
above, respondents have wholly failed to sustain their burden of proving in this particular 
case that any exemption from disclosure applies to the three specific documents at issue 
here - the judge's letter and the unredacted Inmate Status and COMPAS reports . 
Finally, since I find that depriving petitioner of the unredacted reports as well as the 
judge's letter deprived Ms. Andrews of an opportunity to respond to their contents at her 
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January 2014 parole hearing, I am directing a new hearing before different Commissioners 
within thirty days of the date of entry of this order. I am also directing that, at least ten ( 1 O 
days) before that hearing, petitioner be provided with an unredacted Inmate Status Report, 
an unredacted COM PAS report, and a copy of the judge's 2012 letter. In the event a new 
request is made of that judge and is responded to with a new letter, that letter should be 
provided as well. 
Accordingly, it is hereby 
ADJUDGED that the petition is granted to the extent of annulling the January 7, 
2014 decision denying petitioner parole; and it is further 
ORDERED that the matter is remanded for a new parole hearing in accordance with 
the terms of this decision. 
Dated: January 13, 2015 
rl4A N 1 3 2015 Uc~~75-; 
ALICE SCHLESINGER 
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